Abstract-Modern critical systems are facing an increasingly number of new security risks. Nowadays, the extensive use of third-party components and tools during design, and the massive outsourcing overseas of the implementation and integration of systems parts, augment the chances for the introduction of malicious system alterations along the development lifecycle. In addition, the growing dominance of monocultures in the cyberspace, comprising collections of identical interconnected computer platforms, leads to systems that are subject to the same vulnerabilities and attacks. This is especially important for cyber-physical systems, which interconnect cyberspace with computing resources and physical processes. The application of concepts and principles from design diversity to the development and operation of critical systems can help palliate these emerging security challenges. This paper defines and analyzes models of fault tolerant architectures for secure systems that rely on the use of design diversity. The models are built using minimal extensions to classical architectures according to a set of defined failure classes for secure services. A number of metrics are provided to quantify fault tolerance and performance as a function of design diversity. The architectures are analyzed with respect to the design diversity, and compared based on the undetected failure probability, the number of tolerated and detected failures, and the performance delay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Design diversity [1, 2] was defined as an approach in which hardware and software elements used for multiple computations are not copies, but are independently designed with the purpose of avoiding common-mode failures provoked by design faults. As explained in [3] , design faults are a source of common-mode failures that defeat fault tolerance strategies based on strict replication and generally have catastrophic consequences. Apart from random mistakes produced during development (such as specification or implementation errors), design faults can maliciously be created by intelligent attackers with the purpose of introducing exploitable vulnerabilities or defeating the system at operation. An example is the so-called hardware Trojan [4] , consisting of a malicious modification of an IC (Integrated Circuit) introduced during its development, for example within a circuit design file or the mask layout. Nowadays, the increasing reliance on third party components and tools during design, as well as the massive outsourcing overseas of important phases of the system development (such as implementation, fabrication or integration), augment the chances for malicious alterations to happen both in hardware and software elements. Even when systems are developed in-house and proved functionally correct, they can still have side-effects or unintended behaviors during operation that are exploitable by attackers, for example due to unnecessary parts of a design left over in the final system that create covert channels [5] . In addition, the growing dominance of monocultures in the cyberspace, comprising collections of identical interconnected computer platforms, leads to systems that are subject to the same vulnerabilities and attacks [6] . This is especially important for cyber-physical systems (such as modern transportation or power supply systems), which interconnect cyberspace with computing resources and physical processes [7] .
Apart from design diversity, other forms of diversity have also been proposed for secure systems [8, 9, 10, 6] . For example, the authors in [6] suggest the use of artificial diversity based on randomization [11] or obfuscation [12] to defend monocultures against technology attacks by forcing attackers to individualize exploits and converting attacks into crashes that prevent propagation. Thus, by using artificial diversity, contained attacks that seek to compromise integrity or confidentiality can adversely affect availability due to system crashes. In this sense, strategies based on design diversity can help guarantee acceptable levels of system availability not only in information systems but especially in safety-critical systems, including cyber-physical systems. As reported in [7] , the increasing reliance on cyber-physical systems has provoked that the traditional ordering of cybersecurity priorities does no longer hold: for these systems, availability often becomes more important than confidentiality and integrity.
Design diversity is the basis for the software fault tolerant techniques known as recovery blocks [13] and N-version programming [14] , which are inspired respectively on the standby sparing and N-modular redundancy hardware architectures [15] . Based on these techniques, Laprie et al. [3] define and analyze hardware and software fault tolerant architectures, whose structure relies on the definition and combination of error-confinement areas for both hardware components (HECA) and software variants (SECA). The authors define architectures tolerating a single fault and two consecutive faults, and adopt a Markov approach for analyzing and evaluating single-fault based architectures. Several authors have developed metrics and approaches to quantify design diversity and study its properties. In [16] , the authors analyze N-version software with respect to its structural diversity, fault diversity, though-spot diversity and failure diversity. A diversity metric is proposed in [17] to measure the reliability and availability of duplex system designs based on combinational circuits. Fault injection is employed in [18] to analyze common-mode failures in multi-version software. Practical applications of design diversity techniques have shown how it can improve both dependability and security. An example of application of design diversity for security is provided in [19] , where N-version programming is combined with program flow monitoring to protect against computer viruses. In [20] , the authors propose an architecture of heterogeneous COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) processors that employs voting and fragmentation techniques to tolerate the effects of hardware Trojans. Design diversity principles and techniques have also been employed in commercial critical systems, such as the Airbus [21] and Boeing [22] .
In this paper, we define and analyze models of fault tolerant architectures for secure systems that rely on the use of design diversity. Three classical architectures are considered (N-modular redundancy with majority voting, standby sparing with error detection, and standby sparing with comparison), for which the number of variants 1 is calculated using an extended fault model that accounts for common-mode failures (Section II). The proposed architectural models for secure systems are built using minimal extensions to the classical architectures according to a set of defined failure classes for secure services (Section III). A number of metrics are provided to quantify fault tolerance properties and performance delays as a function of design diversity (Section IV). The architectures are analyzed with respect to the design diversity, and compared based on the undetected failure probability, the number of tolerated and detected failures, and the performance delay (Section V). Our conclusions are provided in Section VI. 1 In a diversified design, the different systems produced from a common service specification are called variants [3] . Figure 1 shows three classical fault tolerant architectures which are used in this paper. The interested reader can refer to [15] for a detailed description of fault tolerant architectures. Figure 1a shows an N-modular redundancy architecture (NMR), which typically features a majority voter. Figure 1b displays a typical standby sparing architecture with error detection (SED), while Figure 1c shows a standby sparing architecture with comparison (SCP). NMR and SED are the basis for the N-version programming [14] and recovery blocks [13] methodologies, respectively. On the other hand, the N self-checking programming [3] strategy is based on either SED or SCP.
II. CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURES AND EXTENDED FAULT MODEL

A. Classical Fault Tolerant Architectures
B. Calculation of the Number of Variants with an Extended
Fault Model 
Standby sparing with error detection (SED)
Standby sparing with comparison (SCP) The fault model considered by expressions (1), (3) and (5) includes both separate and common-mode failures whether they occur sequentially or concurrently. On the other hand, expressions (2), (4) and (6) can be derived respectively from expressions (1), (3) and (5) by considering separate failures ( 1) that occur sequentially ( 1). The latter expressions are used in [3] to characterize architectures based on N-version programming (expression (2)), recovery blocks (expression (4)), and N self-checking programming (expressions (4) and (6)).
As an example, consider the failure scenario given in Figure  2 . Empty circles represent variants delivering the correct output, while other symbols represent variants delivering incorrect outputs (same shape for the same failure type, and same filling for the same output). The failure scenario consists of one common-mode failure of commonality two ( 1, 2) and three separate failures ( 3, 1) . According to expressions (1) , (3) and (5), NMR needs eight variants to tolerate these failures, SED needs six, and SCP twelve. While NMR is independent of how failures are distributed among variants, SCP is sensitive to such a distribution and will fail to tolerate (or detect) the failure scenario of Figure 2 . Indeed, the acting pair of variants and produce the same incorrect output and their comparator will accept such an output as correct, leading to an undetected failure. On the other hand, whether SED will tolerate (or detect) a failure scenario will depend on the coverage of the error detection. In Figure 2 , if the error detector connected to the acting variant is not designed to (fully) cover a failure of type 1, such a failure can remain undetected. Accordingly, among these three architectures, only NMR (assuming precise voting 2 ) can guarantee a priori that a failure scenario like the one of Figure 2 will not remain undetected. Therefore, apart from the number of variants, the error detection coverage and the failure distribution are also important parameters to take into consideration when analyzing and comparing fault tolerant architectures (see sections IV and V). For secure systems, such a consideration becomes even more important since intelligent attacks will primarily target failure scenarios that remain undetected.
III. DEFINITION OF ARCHITECTURES FOR SECURITY
A. Failure Classes of a Secure Service
We distinguish four major failure classes that can corrupt a secure service, namely: functionality change, performance degradation, denial of service (DoS), and information leakage. These failure classes are illustrated in Figure 3 . As depicted in Figure 3 , the failure classes occur at the (output) service boundary of a secure system. Other security faults or failures (e.g., intrusions, malicious logic, vulnerabilities, etc.) will either remain latent within the system or eventually manifest at the service boundary as (at least) one of these four major classes. Note that these classes can lead to combined failures (e.g., an incorrect result delivered late containing hidden leaked data). Figure 4 shows the relationship between the secure service failure classes and the security attributes. As represented in Figure 4 , functionality changes are primarily related to a violation of the system's integrity, information leakage impacts confidentiality, while performance degradation and denial of service impair the availability of the system.
B. Architectures for Security
The goal is to provide minimal extensions to the fault tolerant architectures of Figure 1 so as to achieve architectures for security that cover the taxonomy of secure service failures described in Section III.A. Figure 5 shows the extended NMR architecture for security. In Figure 5 , functionality changes are masked by the majority voter. Information leakage is also masked by the voter when data is leaked through the main output of the variants (referred to as main-channel information leakage). When data is leaked via side-channels, custom detectors can be attached to each variant (components Side-Channel Inf. Leak Detection A variant whose performance is degraded or is under a DoS attack, may issue an output with an extra delay or not issue an output at all. As a result, such an output may not be available in the corresponding Sync cell by a certain time (e.g., a deadline for real-time tasks). Component Perf. Degradation & DoS Detection is responsible for detecting this situation, by counting the number of times a variant's output is delayed or missing as well as counting the number of affected variants (e.g., a signal can be raised when the number of affected variants becomes a majority). Depending on implementations, a Sync cell may keep a previous value as a result of a delay or omission. Component Perf. Degradation & DoS Detection is thus connected to the voter's output to support detecting this situation (e.g., if a cell's value did not change and differs from the voted majority, then the output of the corresponding variant might be considered delayed or omitted). In Figure 5 , the root-of-trust would comprise the voter, the Sync component and the Perf. Degradation & DoS Detection component. The implementation of these components should be simple enough so that they can be formally verified and proved correct and free of faults and vulnerabilities. Conversely, components Side-Channel Inf. Leak Detection will likely have a higher degree of complexity and require to be customized to the specific characteristics and implementation details of each variant. Accordingly, they have not been included in the root-of-trust. Figure 6 shows the extended SED architecture for security. In the SED architecture, functionality changes are typically signaled by the error detectors . The extension for security relies on the inclusion of an additional security module per variant, responsible for detecting main-channel information leakage (i.e., data leaked via the variants' main output), performance degradation and denial of service. As in the extended NMR architecture, detection of side-channel information leakage is performed by separate, independent modules attached to each variant (components Side-Channel Inf. Leak Detection ). As for an error detector, the efficiency of a security module will mainly depend on its detection coverage, i.e., how well it covers all the different manifestations of the faults or failures it is designed to protect against. While the logic to detect a performance degradation and denial of service can be made simple (e.g., based on a watchdog timer), the detection of information leakage may require complex mechanisms to achieve a reasonable level of coverage. The rootof-trust can include the error detectors , the security modules and the switching element. Whether these elements can practically be part of the root-of-trust will mainly depend on how well their complexity can be mastered towards achieving complete formal proofs of their correctness and trustworthiness. In particular, for components and , such a complexity will also have to be balanced with the desired level of detection coverage (i.e., a higher detection coverage will generally lead to a higher implementation complexity). Figure 7 shows the extended SCP architecture for security. In the SCP architecture, the comparators are suitable for detecting functionality changes and main-channel information leakage. The extension for security relies on adding, for each variant, explicit mechanisms for synchronization ( 
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 , , as defined in TABLE I.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the degree of diversity of the variants. The higher the value of is, the more diverse the variants are.  is the probability (within 0,1 ) that is equal to value ( 1).  is the probability (within 0,1 ) that is equal to or lower than value ( 1).  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability of undetected failure.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability that a failure occurs.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability that the failure cannot be detected nor tolerated by components within the root-of-trust. For the side-channel information leakage failure, this probability is considered equal to one.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability that the failure cannot be detected nor tolerated by components outside of the root-of-trust.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability of undetected failure due to a lack of error detection coverage.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability of undetected failure due to unavailability of non-faulty variants.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the probability of undetected failure for causes other than noncoverage or unavailability (e.g., a fault within a decider itself).  ( 0) is the maximum delay to receive the results from all the variants connected to a decider.  ( 0) is the maximum execution time of the variants connected to a decider when their diversity is close to zero ( 0), i.e., they are exact replicas.  ∆ (∆ 0) is the maximum increase with respect to in the execution time of the variants connected to a decider when the variants are highly diverse (i.e., 1).  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is the influence of the number of variants in the delays. In general, the more variants, the higher the influence. It can be modeled as 1 ⁄ , with being the number of variants connected to a decider or switcher, and ( ) the maximum number of variants that can feasibly be connected.  ( 0) is the maximum delay introduced by the execution of a decider.  ( 0) is a constant overhead in the execution time of a decider.  ( 0) is the highest overhead that can be incurred by the variants in the execution time of a decider.  ( 0) is the highest execution time overhead of a decider resulting from the detection of an error.  ( 0) is the maximum delay due to service disruption introduced by a switcher during error recovery.  ( 0) is a constant delay for the service disruption introduced by a switcher.  ( ∈ 0,1 ) is a percentage for the number of spares in hot standby mode.  ( 0) is the highest time overhead that can be incurred in service disruption to find a spare in hot standby mode that is in good standing.  ( 0) is the highest time overhead that can be incurred in service disruption to set up and find a spare in good standing among the set of spares that are not in hot standby mode (e.g., they are turned off) when their diversity is close to zero (i.e., 0), i.e., they are exact replicas.  ∆ (∆ 0) is the maximum increase with respect to in service disruption when spares that are not in hot standby mode are highly diverse (i.e., 1).
Notes:
 For all metrics, variant set . . is implicit. When a metric applies only to a subset of variants (e.g., , ), it is indicated in the subindex (e.g., _ , ).  When a metric applies to a specific component (e.g., identified as ID), it is indicated in the subindex (e.g., _ ).
Otherwise (8) and (9) provide respectively the probability mass function and cumulative distribution function of .
The probability of undetected failure (10) in TABLE  III is also calculated as a function of the design diversity (see  TABLE IV ). It combines the probabilities that a failure occurs ( ) and that the failure cannot be detected nor tolerated by components located within the root-of-trust ( ) or outside of the root-of-trust ( ). (Note that for the architectural models provided in Section III, the root-of-trust can handle all failure classes except for the side-channel information leakage; accordingly, 1 for side-channel information leakage failures.)
The probability that a failure remains undetected within the root-of-trust can be calculated as described by expression (11) of TABLE III. The main reasons for which a root-of-trust may not tolerate (i.e., mask or recover) nor detect a failure thus leading to the delivery of an undetected faulty result, are because (i) the deciders within the root-of-trust are not designed to (fully) cover a certain type of failure (probability ), or because (ii) there is not a sufficient set of variants providing non-faulty results in order for the deciders to detect a failure or make a right choice (probability ). Other reasons (such as a fault within a decider itself) are considered unlikely to affect a rootof-trust, therefore probability 0. 
 Expressions for and are lower bound estimations, leading to lower bound values for probabilities (17) and (20 (16) refers to the likelihood that a majority of variants provide the same faulty response, making the voter select and deliver an undetected faulty result. This is equivalent to the probability that the maximum extent of a common-mode failure is higher than 2 ⁄ , written as 2 ⁄ 1 2 ⁄ . This leads to expression (16) in TABLE IV. Note that there will be a certain level of design diversity for which it will become very unlikely that a common-mode failure affects more than 2 ⁄ variants. In general, the higher the diversity among the variants, the lower the extent of common-mode failures, thus the lower the probability 2 ⁄ . The influence of design diversity on such a probability is taken into consideration by expression (9).
 For architecture SED/sec, probability (18) is zero since the detection components ( or ) can potentially signal a failure irrespective of the variants affected. However, a non-covered failure that affects either the acting variant or a variant selected after error signaling, will not be detected and will lead to the delivery of a faulty result. Such an event is considered by probability (17) in TABLE IV. It combines the probabilities for (i) the failure of the acting variant, (ii) the failure of the switched-over variant after error signaling, and (iii) the failure coverage (averaged summation of each failure type's coverage). Note that undetected failures can still occur even if all variants are (near-)perfectly diverse. This is not the case for architecture NMR/sec, since when the value of diversity approaches one, only separate failures occur (i.e., 1) which cannot lead to a majority. Design diversity has thus a lower influence in architecture SED/sec. In general, it may help lower the probability of undetected failures by reducing the extent of common-mode failures , thus reducing the number of failed variants per failure and so the likelihood that a failure reaches the acting (or switched-over) variant. This has been taken into account by adding a factor for the estimated number of failed variants as a function of in Figure 2 will remain undetected. In general, an undetected failure occurs when a pair of variants and are affected by the same common-mode failure, such that the affected variants are either the acting pair (like in Figure 2 ) or a pair selected after error signaling. Such an event is considered by probability (20) in TABLE IV. It combines the probabilities for (i) the failure of the acting pair of variants, (ii) the failure of the switched-over pair of variants after error signaling, and (iii) the common-mode failure of a pair of variants. As for NMR/sec, design diversity plays an important role in the SCP/sec architecture. Indeed, if variants are (near-)perfectly diverse, the variants within a pair will fail independently, thus no undetected failure arise (i.e., 0 when 1).
We characterize the performance delays of an architecture by means of expressions (12), (13) and (14) in TABLE III. Expression corresponds to the maximum delay for a decider to receive the results from all its connected variants. Expression corresponds to the maximum delay introduced by the execution of a decider. Expression corresponds to the maximum delay of the service disruption introduced by a switcher during error recovery. Note that, as modeled via parameter , all the three metrics are affected by the number of variants connected to a decider ( , ) or switcher ( ). However, while delays and are impacted by the diversity of the variants, is not. Indeed, the differences among execution times of the variants will influence the time needed to receive their results as the number of variants and their diversity increase. On the other hand, service disruption will generally be longer when a switcher needs to find a spare in good standing among a large pool of spares, especially if the spares are not in hot standby mode and their setup times increasingly differ with their diversity. Regarding a decider, it will generally need more time to process data received from a higher number of variants. However, the delay introduced by a decider is not affected by how diverse the variants are, since a decider processes either the same non-diversity points from the variants (like a voter) or (non-)diversity points from a single variant (like a custom error detector for side-channel information leakage. Expressions (21), (22) and (23) in TABLE V propose custom expressions to characterize the performance delay of architectures NMR/sec, SED/sec and SCP/sec, respectively. Such a delay corresponds to the maximum time needed by an architecture to process an input and deliver the result, and takes into account the different execution times of the variants ( ) and deciders ( ), as well as the service disruption time during recovery ( ). The delay of architecture NMR/sec (21) V. ANALYSIS Figure 8 shows the probability of undetected failure of the architectures with respect to the design diversity, for a number of variants equal to 4 ( Figure 8a ) and 6 (Figure 8b ) for all architectures. The total error detection coverage of SED/sec is set to 0.9 (variable / in TABLE IV). Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 and 1 in Figure  8 and Figure 9 (see expression (10) of TABLE III). In Figure 8a , when the architectures are made up of four variants and variants are exact replicas of each other ( 0), architecture SCP/sec has the highest probability of undetected failure (0.53) followed by NMR/sec (0.5) and SED/sec (0.12). When the diversity among the variants increases but is still poor ( ∈ 0,0.334 ), the undetected failure probability for NMR/sec becomes higher than for SCP/sec, followed by SED/sec. Indeed, the commonality of failures decreases as the diversity improves, such that the probability of a common-mode failure affecting the acting pair of variants in SCP/sec becomes lower than the probability of having a majority of variants affected by the same failure in NMR/sec. For NMR/sec, there is a certain level of diversity ( 0.334) from which it is very unlikely that variants affected by the same common-mode failure become a majority, thus the undetected failure probability becomes zero. Architecture SCP/sec needs a higher level of diversity ( 0.667) to achieve a zero probability, from which the acting pair of variants is highly unlikely to be affected by the same commonmode failure. Note that diversity has a significantly lower influence in SED/sec than in the other architectures. The undetected failure probability for SED/sec slightly decreases for a certain level of diversity ( 0.667 ), when the extent of common-mode failures becomes significantly more limited thus lowering the probability of reaching the acting variant. Note that the probability of SED/sec cannot become zero by increasing the design diversity, but the degree of error detection coverage would need to be increased instead to a value close to one ( 1).
In Figure 8b , for architectures with six variants and no diversity ( 0), the undetected failure probability for NMR/sec and SCP/sec becomes very similar ( 0.5), followed by SED/sec (0.1). Indeed, compared to Figure 8a , the fact of having more variants might make it less likely in general that a failure reaches the acting variants in SCP/sec and SED/sec for no diversity. As the diversity increases, the undetected failure probability follows a similar trend as in Figure 8a but becomes more sensitive to the diversity, going from three significant changes in Figure 8a to five in Figure 8b . Certain diversity intervals lead to a similar probability for various architectures, such as ∈ 0.2,0.4 for NMR/sec and SCP/sec, and ∈ 0.6,0.8 for SED/sec and SCP/sec. Since the number of variants is higher than in Figure 8a , a greater effort is needed to make variants more diverse in architectures NMR/sec and SCP/sec, so that the undetected failure probability can be reduced to value zero (namely, 0.4 for NMR/sec and 0.8 for SCP/sec). Figure 9a shows the probability of undetected failure with respect to the design diversity, when the architectures have a different number of variants. The number of variants has been set as in the failure scenario of Figure 2 (8 for NMR/sec, 6 for SED/sec and 12 for SCP/sec), with a coverage of 0.9 for SED/sec. In Figure 9b , the total coverage for both NMR/sec ( / ) and SCP/sec ( / ) is set to 0.9 instead of one to consider the impact of imprecise voting/comparison (see expressions (15) and (19) 
of TABLE IV).
As shown in Figure 9a , NMR/sec and SCP/sec lead to a zero probability for 0.429 and 0.91, respectively. In the failure scenario of Figure 2 , the maximum extent of a common-mode failure is two, which can occur for a diversity value within interval ∈ 0.6,0.91 (i.e., union of intervals 0.715,0.858 for NMR/sec, 0.6,0.8 for SED/sec and 0.819,0.91 for SCP/sec). Within such an interval, the undetected failure probability of architectures SED/sec and SCP/sec is higher than zero. Accordingly, only architecture NMR/sec guarantees that a failure scenario like the one of Figure 2 does not remain undetected, which confirms what was already asserted in Section II.B. Note however that this does not hold if imprecise voting is used, since then the probability for NMR/sec is no longer zero as shown in Figure 9b. (a) (b) Figure 9 . Undetected failure probability vs. design diversity for architectures with unequal number of variants (8 for NMR/sec, 6 for SED/sec and 12 for SCP/sec).
An example for the estimation of design diversity based on the experimental results obtained in [1] , is provided in TABLE VI and Figure 10 . Based on the results from TABLE VI, the value of the design diversity can be estimated using expressions (10) (with 1), (15) and (16) as shown in Figure 10 . According to TABLE VI, a total of 2,496 undetected failures did occur. Therefore, the variants are not diverse enough to avoid common-mode failures that affect a majority of variants, thus the design diversity threshold of 0.5 shown in Figure 10 (from which the undetected failure probability becomes zero) is not considered to be reached. The value of the design diversity should thus be found within interval 0,0.5 as given by a function crossing points 0, 0.143 and 0.5, 0 . When using a linear function, the value of the design diversity for 0.03 is calculated as 0.395, as shown in Figure 10 . Such a value for the design diversity is reasonable given some of the conditions for the development of the variants [1] , such as: variants were written in the same programming language (PL/1), programmers were students from the same school (UCLA), programmers lacked familiarity with some of the specification languages used (OBJ, PDL) and received the same training, variants shared the same execution platform and operating system, etc. As stated in [1] , one of the primary aims was to study the increase in reliability to be gained with imperfect programs used in N-version systems. Figure 11 shows the number of tolerated failures ( Figure  11a ) and detected/tolerated failures (Figure 11b ) with respect to the design diversity for architectures with four variants. According to Figure 11a , none of the architectures can tolerate failures for 0 since a common-mode failure can impact all variants. When diversity increases ( 0), there is a certain diversity threshold ( 0.667) below which neither NMR/sec nor SCP/sec can tolerate failures, while SED/sec is able to tolerate one failure of maximum commonality. Above such a diversity threshold ( 0.667) only separate failures occur, leading to three tolerated failures for SED/sec, two for NMR/sec and one for SCP/sec. On the other hand, Figure 11b displays the number of failures that are either detected or tolerated by the architectures. For 0, only architecture SED/sec is able to detect a common-mode failure that affects all variants. Within interval ∈ 0,0.334 , architecture NMR/sec cannot detect or tolerate failures, while both SED/sec and SCP/sec can detect or tolerate one failure. For interval ∈ 0.334,0.667 , the number of failures detected or tolerated by both NMR/sec and SED/sec increases to two. Over such an interval ( 0.667) only separate failures occur, and all architectures are able to detect four failures. TABLE III ). The execution time of the variants has been set to span from 10 to 100. In Figure 12a , the percentage of hot spares for SED/sec and SCP/sec is 0.9, while in Figure 12b all spares are in hot standby mode ( 1).
(a) (b) Figure 12 . Maximum performance delay vs. design diversity ((a) χ 0.9, (b) χ 1).
As shown in Figure 12a , NMR/sec leads to the lowest delay, while SED/sec and SCP/sec introduce a similar delay. The delay increases with the degree of diversity of the variants (and spares). Indeed, the more diverse the variants are, the higher their differences in terms of performance. The delay for NMR/sec varies approximately between 10 and 100, which covers the range of diverse execution times of the variants. For architectures SED/sec and SCP/sec, the delay is highly impacted by the setup time of spares that are not in hot standby mode, leading to times approximately between 100 and 300. Such a delay mainly results from the execution times of the variants (ranging from 10 to 100) combined with a tenth of the maximum setup times (leading to delays approximately between 100 to 200 ). Note that the performance delay introduced by the deciders ( 4) is independent of diversity and has a minor impact compared to the execution times of the variants and setup times of spares. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 12b , when all spares for SED/sec and SCP/sec are in hot standby mode, the delay of both architectures approaches that of architecture NMR/sec.
VI.
CONCLUSION For secure systems, attackers are likely to introduce intelligent faults that target undetected scenarios. Commonmode failures are thus of primary concern since these can easily defeat fault tolerance strategies relying on redundant components. The consideration of design diversity becomes 
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Design Diversity then relevant since it can help reduce or avoid the occurrence of common-mode failures that lead to undetected failures. The approach provided in this paper has allowed to define fault tolerant architectures for secure systems and compare them with respect to the design diversity. The failure manifestations of secure systems have been abstracted and classified into four major classes (functionality change, performance degradation, denial of service and main/side channel information leakage). These failure classes have been considered by extended architectures for security based on N-modular redundancy with majority voting (NMR/sec), standby sparing with error detection (SED/sec), and standby sparing with comparison (SCP/sec). The architectural models define a root-of-trust that handles all failure classes except the side-channel information leakage. Indeed, side-channel information leakage occurs outside of the root-of-trust of the architectures and typically requires the use of custom error detectors or different approaches (such as data fragmentation or obfuscation techniques).
The analysis of the architectures has shown that NMR/sec and SCP/sec (with precise voting and comparison, respectively) can achieve a (near) zero probability of undetected failure when a certain threshold is reached for the degree of design diversity, such a threshold being systematically lower for NMR/sec than for SCP/sec. Conversely, the undetected failure probability for SED/sec mainly depends on the error detection coverage provided by the architecture. For poor levels of design diversity, architecture SED/sec can outperform NMR/sec and SCP/sec in terms of undetected failure probability when the provided error detection coverage is high enough. The analysis has also provided results regarding the number of tolerated and detected failures for a given number of variants, considering that failures occur sequentially with the maximum commonality. In general, architecture SED/sec with perfect error detection provides better fault tolerance, while NMR/sec needs to achieve certain design diversity threshold to be able to tolerate or detect failures. Regarding the maximum performance impact of the architectures, NMR/sec generally provides better performance than SED/sec and SCP/sec, since the latter architectures may employ spares that are not in hot standby mode requiring significant initialization and setup times. When only hot spares are used, all architectures provide a similar performance, with NMR/sec having a slightly better performance due to the absence of a switcher. A case study based on experimental results has also been provided for the estimation of the degree of design diversity achieved in an actual fault tolerant system.
In general, the approach undertaken in the paper provides valuable foundations for the definition and analysis of fault tolerant architectures for secure systems that rely on the use of design diversity, and helps gaining a better understanding of the properties and tradeoffs involved with the use of different architectural models.
